Perhaps this was a reason for Hitler to stop the German advance. These attacks, combined with Maxime Weygand`s hedgehog tactics, were to become the main base for responding to blitzkrieg attacks in the future: the deep use that allowed the enemy or „shoulders” of an intrusion was essential to channel the enemy attack, and the artillery properly deployed on the shoulders could take a heavy toll on the attackers. While Allied forces lacked the experience to successfully develop these strategies in 1940, leading to the surrender of the France with heavy losses, they characterized subsequent Allied operations. In the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army used a combination of deep defense, vast minefields, and stubborn defense of pierced shoulders. In this way, they exhausted German combat power, even as German forces advanced. [Citation needed] The opposite is evident in the Russian offensive of the summer of 1944, Operation Bagration, which led to the destruction of Army Group Central. German attempts to weather the storm and fight by encirclement failed due to Russia`s ability to continue to feed armored units in the attack, maintain the mobility and strength of the offensive, and take effect deep in the rear areas, faster than the Germans could regroup. [Citation needed] A blitzkrieg is an intense and brutal military campaign. If you study the history of World War II, you will eventually come across the word Blitzkrieg. In 1916, General Alexei Brusilov used surprise and infiltration tactics during the Brusilov Offensive.
Later, Field Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky (1893-1937), Georgii Isserson [ru] (1898-1976) and other members of the Red Army developed a concept of deep battle from the experiences of the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1920. These concepts will guide the doctrine of the Red Army during the Second World War. Tukhachevsky recognized the limitations of infantry and cavalry and advocated the mechanized formations and large-scale industrialization they required. Robert Watt (2008) wrote that blitzkrieg has little in common with deep Soviet battle. [49] In 2002, H. P. Willmott noted that the deep battle contained two important differences: it was a doctrine of total war (open-ended operations) and rejected the decisive battle in favor of several large simultaneous offensives. [50] The standard of living was not high in the late 1930s. Consumption of consumer goods had risen from 71% in 1928 to 59% in 1938. The demands of the war economy have reduced the amount of spending in non-military sectors to meet the demand of the armed forces.
On September 9, Goering, as head of the Reich Defense Council, demanded full „employment” of the vital and fighting power of the national economy for the duration of the war. Overy presents this as proof that there was no „blitzkrieg economy”. [135] Or, in the case of Professor Gates, I cannot decide whether I should politely ask you to leave my house, or whether I should threaten you with a career swing. In the 1960s, Alan Milward developed a theory of blitzkrieg economics that Germany could not wage a long war and chose to avoid complete rearmament and be widely armed to achieve quick victories. The word, which in its strategic sense means „blitzkrieg” or „lightning attack,” describes a series of short, quick and decisive battles to knock out an enemy state before it can be fully mobilized. German forces used some tactics associated with Blitzkrieg during the Spanish Civil War in 1936 and the invasion of Poland in 1939, including combined air-to-ground attacks and the use of armored tank divisions to quickly annihilate poorly equipped Polish troops.