It may seem that this general type of disagreement tells us nothing about language, except perhaps that language has no particular meaning in law. It may appear that the two courts did not disagree on a language issue (after all, all parties involved had English proficiency), but only on whether they should achieve Parliament`s obvious objective of protecting roads by convicting Mr. Burr or whether it would be unfair to him. Secondly, the vagueness of the legal language is unmistakable, because the legislator avoids ordinary vague expressions such as „driving very fast” and prefers precise speed limits (or blood alcohol limits…). When the law uses vague language, it uses abstract evaluative terms. As a general rule, the legislator does not prohibit driving with „bald” tires; Either they prescribe specific measurements (e.g. Tyre tread measurements) or address the problem in the context of an abstract general prohibition, e.g. for „reckless” driving. An abstract standard asks its subjects to construct a vision of how a driver owes to another person in his law – and not just ask the seemingly useless question, how bald is a bald tire?). Abstract norms are a very common and important part of legislative technique.
A standard of negligence may require „due diligence”; A constitution may define a procedural right as a right to „due process,” or a contract may require delivery of goods in a „satisfactory condition.” These abstract terms are very different from the vague descriptive terms that philosophers of logic use to illustrate their arguments about the Sorite paradox („tail”, „thin”, „bald”, „red”…). One might think that it is needless to say that abstract norms do not draw sharp lines because they are not intended to draw lines at all. Using an abstract standard, the legislator requires those who are required to apply the law to construct a theory of the norm (care, process, or condition) that draws any necessary limits. Ronald Dworkin argued that abstract expressions are not vague at all – that they have different semantics than vague words like „heap” (Dworkin, 1986b, 17). Bentham and Austin would have had an answer: that people generally abuse the word „obligation.” They do not give it meaning that can be explained by reference to sensitive objects. Bentham and Austin were philosophers of language, but (unlike J.L. Austin) not ordinary philosophers of language. They were looking for a way to use language that supported their empiricism and utilitarianism, and they were actually happy when this technique required a reorganization of ordinary language: it showed that they were revealing what had been obscured by pure skill. „As we learned more about how these jury instructions and this `objectively reasonableness` standard are issued, we were curious about what that language actually means to an aspiring juror?” „Near” pragmatics (for Kortas and Perry`s distinction between „near” and „distant” pragmatic, see pragmatic) is a question of what is said by a statement; The Armchair discussion will focus on the use of avoided indices and pronominal numbers in legislation, and the implications of context for understanding the use of terms.
And „distant” pragmatics (which determines what is implicit and unsaid, and determines which speech acts are performed by means of utterance) can involve figurative uses of language such as sarcasm, allusions and other techniques that legislators avoid. Marmor`s assertion that pragmatics in law are different has some force. Legislation systematically avoids many of the means of communication that can be so useful in other communication contexts. But these devices are also avoided in a variety of other formal and technical language uses – for example, in most wedding invitations, in Wikipedia articles that haven`t been hacked, and in well-written guides on how to apply for a bank account or operate a rice cooker. The dependence of the effect of legal language on context is an example of a general feature of communication that some philosophers of language have approached by distinguishing semantics from pragmatics. The distinction is roughly between the meaning of a word, phrase or other linguistic expression and the effect attributable to the use of the expression in a particular way by a particular user of the language in a particular context. The pragmatics of legal language is a vast field because the term „pragmatic” could be used as a title for much of what modern jurists and theorists have described as grounds for interpretation. In fact, „pragmatic” could also be used as a title for much of what they described as a theory of interpretation – since „pragmatic” is a term not only for the effects of communication, but also for the study of those effects. For example, the work of judges in Garner v. Burr can be described as an exercise in pragmatic reasoning.
The technical sound of the word „pragmatic” might indicate that it is a term for the theoretical study of its subject; In fact, field of study is what could be inferred from the fact that someone said what they said in the context in which they said it. No object of investigation is less suitable for theorization. Once you have learned the legal meaning of words, you are expected to use them accurately. Replacing one with the other can lead to serious mistakes and misunderstandings. The legal meaning of words is the common language of lawyers and judges who rely on this language to communicate efficiently and effectively. Second, I suggest that to build on the success of plain language, we need to help key decision-makers in business and government see plain language in a new light. Progress depends on simple language that recognizes its success and how that success has changed it. But what position should plain language take? Joseph Raz rejected Hart`s contention that normative terms in legal statements have a distinctive meaning. According to Raz, a normative statement such as „You have to stop at a red light” implies that you have some type of reason to act. If it is a statement that applies the law, it implies that you have reasons to stop from the point of view of the law. Raz`s theory of law, unlike Hart`s, is part of a theory of practical reason in general, and his presentation of normative statements treats them as having the same meaning in law and morality. Hart first thought that this approach would necessarily lead to an extreme type of natural law theory, in which any true legal statement is necessarily a true moral statement, and any valid legal obligation is necessarily a moral obligation.
But Raz resolved Hart`s concerns by pointing out that normative statements can be made in a distanced manner. People can do so without supporting the view from which the reasons they give are valid (see Raz 1990, 175-177).