The right to refuse medical treatment in general is a very complex area of law. Due to conflicting precedents, the validity of refusal of treatment depends on the patient`s situation. For example, if the patient is a minor, the courts have generally ordered that blood transfusions be given in life-threatening cases because the parents raised objections based on their decision on religious grounds. State laws vary and are less clear for a minor in a situation that is not life-threatening. If the minor is a teenager, a joint rejection of the patient and parents would likely be valid. However, as the following case study shows, this does not necessarily preclude litigation against these health care providers in the event of patient injury or death, even if competent adult patients or their legal guardians receive full consent discussions about the risks of rejection of blood and blood products and these communications are documented in the medical record. In Storar 52 N.Y. 2d 363, 420 N.E. 2d 64, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981), the New York Court of Appeals refused to base the right to refuse treatment on a constitutional right of personality. Instead, it found that such a right was „sufficiently supported” by the doctrine of informed consent. Id., 376377, 420 N.E. 2d, p. 70. In re Eichner (decided with In re Storar, op. cit. O.) An 83-year-old man who had suffered brain damage from anoxia entered a vegetative state and was therefore unable to consent to the removal of his ventilator. However, the court found that it was not necessary to consider whether his rights could be exercised by others, as it found the evidence clear and convincing from the patient`s statements when he was able to do so that he „did not want to be kept in a vegetative coma by the use of a ventilator”. Id., at 380, 420 N.E.
2d, at 72. In the Storar case, a 52-year-old man suffering from bladder cancer was profoundly retarded for most of his life. The tribunal implicitly rejected the approach taken in Saike Wicz, op. cit. cit., arguing that because of this ongoing incompetence, „it is unrealistic to determine whether he would wish to pursue life-prolonging treatment if he were able”. 52 N.Y. 2d, at 380, 420 N.E. 2d, at 72. Given that the evidence showed that the blood transfusions required by the patient did not cause excessive pain and that his mental and physical abilities would deteriorate without them, the court concluded that „he should not allow an unfit patient to bleed to death because someone, even someone as close as a parent or sibling, thinks: that it is better for someone with an incurable disease.” at 382, 420 N.E. 2d, at 73.
Although the above argument is not repeated in Ms B (presumably this point was simply not raised by defence counsel), its validity appears to have been taken for granted. On the other hand, the psychological difficulty for doctors was acknowledged by Ms B. in taking such a step (one doctor said as evidence that she felt compelled to kill Ms B.). Thus, instead of ordering her own doctors to stop ventilation, the judgment approved the transfer of Ms. B. to another hospital where the doctors would be willing to do so.