We originally planned to conduct a similar analysis for countries with reduced stiffness of 0.128 or more. However, there were only 10 such cases and all but 2 of these constitutions were replaced later before 5 years had passed. Ecuador adopted a much more rigid constitution in 1978, but an even more rigid constitution in 1984. As the 1984 Constitution was not adopted until 6 years later, the 1978 treatment can only be used in the 5-year estimates. There were also several increases in stiffness (above the threshold of 0.128) that had to be completely excluded; These were: (1) the Brazilian constitution of 1988, because we had no educational observations; (2) The Thai Constitution of 1968, because it did not last 5 years; 3. the 1967 Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam, since this country ceased to exist in 1975 and is not included in the PWT data; (4) Yemen`s 1970 constitution because PWT data for that country did not exist prior to 1989; and (5) the 1992 constitution of Yugoslavia because PWT data for that country are completely absent. This jump threshold excluded twenty countries from treatment. All but three of these cases saw an increase of less than 0.100. For comparison, we also run a TWFE model with our covariates. These are available upon request (Table 15). We find that the stiffness variable is negative and statistically significant when we look at 5-year and 10-year growth rates as dependent variables.
A. V. Dicey defines a rigid constitution as one according to which certain laws, called constitutional laws or fundamental laws, „cannot be changed in the same manner as ordinary laws.” [2] A rigid constitution establishes „specific legal/constitutional hurdles that must be overcome” before they can be amended, such as special popular consent by referendum, a qualified majority or a special majority in the legislature, or both. [3] In contrast, a flexible constitution is one in which the legislature can change the content and principles of the constitution through the ordinary legislative procedure. [3] Anything that deserves and diminishes a rigid constitution, the fact is that the modern tendency is to have a written constitution and a rigid constitution. There is a future for a rigid constitution that contains some elements of flexibility. Given that India`s constitution has both elements of flexibility and rigidity, this may be an ideal path for generations to come. Should procedural barriers to constitutional changes be more onerous than those to normal policy changes? – that is to say, should constitutions be enshrined? One of the criteria for assessing these issues is economic performance. Using data on countries around the world and constitutional adoptions from 1973 to 2017, we estimate the effect of constitutional anchoring (rigidity) on economic growth. We use matching methods to draw causal inferences. The adoption of a much more rigid constitution than the previous one defines treatment.
In our baseline estimates (based on 19 treatments), the impact on post-treatment growth is generally small and statistically insignificant. However, if we look at a subsample that excludes autocracies (13 treatments), the post-treatment effects are always negative and sometimes statistically significant. The same applies if we exclude treatments related to coups d`état (12 treatments). Contrary to the track record of many scientists, evidence suggests that, if at all (and based on the limited number of treatments available), greater entrenchment leads to less economic growth. In the first case, it is assumed, for example, that moving from an approval threshold of 75% to a threshold of 76% makes a difference; It also assumes that one charge (e.g. legislative) combined with another charge (e.g. referendum) may result in an obvious marginal effect. These assumptions are fundamentally questionable. In addition, the construction of the stiffness variable (see section 3.1 above) challenges assumptions in an applied context. If your institution is not listed, or if you cannot log in to your institution`s website, please contact your librarian or administrator. Voigt, S., Gutmann, J. and Feld, L.
P. (2015). Economic Growth and Independence of the Judiciary a Dozen Years Later: Pan-Canadian Data Based on an Updated Set of Indicators. European Journal of Political Economy, 38, 197-211. This could reflect the fact that societies with larger governments, all others in the same way, are more likely to seek more rigid constraints (although this is only a guess). In addition, Table 4 reflects the initial (logarithmic) GDP per capita negatively and significantly for the definition of the reference treatment (column 1). (The 10% statistical significance level for the higher processing level is narrowly missing.) Weingast, B. R.
(1997). The political foundations of democracy and the rule of law. American Political Science Review, 91(2), 245-263. Weingast, B. R. (1993). Constitutions as governance structures: the political foundations of secure markets. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149(1), 286-311. In this context, Caruso et al. (2012) argue that the extent to which formal constitutional rules influence ordinary politics depends on the degree of institutionalization, i.e. the extent to which actors expect political action to take place within a constraining framework of political rules.